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Abstract 
 
We analyze the welfare effects of part-day teleworking on road traffic congestion in the context of 
Vickrey’s dynamic bottleneck model. Endogenous decisions to become equipped with a teleworking-
enabling technology change the scheduling of arrival times at work for equipped drivers and, due to 
congestion externalities, affects travel costs of all drivers. We show that even costless teleworking might 
be marginally welfare reducing, after reaching the optimal penetration level, as an equipped driver 
imposes a higher travel externality on other equipped drivers than unequipped drivers do. We study 
various possible market configurations for the supply of the technology, and find that private 
monopolistic supply of the technology might yield a higher social welfare than perfectly competitive 
supply. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Road congestion is a challenging and persisting problem. Various policy measures have been proposed 
to tackle congestion, including investment in transport infrastructure and public transit, provision of 
traffic information to drivers, city zoning, road pricing, parking policies and flexible working hours. Since 
Pigou (1920), most economists regard marginal cost pricing of roads as the first-best solution to traffic 
jams; see, for example, the exposition in Small and Verhoef (2007). However, optimal tolling seems 
technically hard to implement in practice; and in part due to its redistributive effect, pricing suffers from 
low political acceptability that further hinders its wide implementation. There are only a few cities, the 
best-known being Singapore, Stockholm, and London, with road pricing schemes, usually in the form of 
a fixed or step cordon toll. The limited feasibility of the first-best policy motivates an ongoing search for 
alternatives. 
Teleworking refers to out-of-office work arrangements, usually from home and sometimes with flexible 
time schedules, and is one of the suggested ways to reduce travel costs. Whole-day teleworking allows 
an individual to avoid commuting between the home and the workplace altogether, while part-day 
teleworking, supposedly, makes it easier to circumvent congestion by commuting during off-peak hours. 
Progress in information and telecommunication technologies (ICT), such as the availability of the remote 
access to secured databases, cloud computing, networks and a general advance of Internet 
technologies, expands both the intensive and the extensive margin of teleworking use. Moreover, 
governments stimulate teleworking use. For instance, in the USA, the Telework Enhancement Act of 
2010 promotes teleworking among public servants (USA Government, 2010). Given the range of 
potential benefits on labor productivity, work-life balance, job matching, and given expected future 
technological progress, one may expect teleworking to be of increasing relevance in the future.1 
Against this background, this paper will investigate the effects of part-day (morning) teleworking on 
congestion from economic perspective. Part-day teleworking is an empirically relevant phenomenon; for 
example, a recent UK survey shows that in 2007 part-day teleworking had a higher incidence rate among 
full-time employees, within a survey’s reference week, than a whole-day teleworking, respectively 17.2 
and 9.8 percent (Haddad, Lyons and Chatterjee, 2009).2 In the context of this paper one might think of 
the employees performing some work tasks from home in the morning, and then coming to an office for 
the rest of the workday. This is an example of what has been dubbed “work fragmentation”, which is not 
uncommon in reality (see, for instance, a survey by KPMG, 2011). The few papers that do model the 
impacts of teleworking on travel introduce a spatial dimension, to capture the long-term effects of 
whole-day teleworking on residential choice within a city; see, among others, Safirova (2002) and Rhee 
(2008). But time-of-day adjustments may also be relevant especially for part-day teleworking. To 
                                                          
1 Increase of the teleworking incidence rate over time has occurred in the past. According to the Eurofound surveys 
(2005, 2010), an employees’ self-reported EU average incidence rates of teleworking for at least one-quarter of 
their time were 4 and 7 percents in, respectively, 2000 and 2005. 
2 There is a large cross country, industry and day of the week variation in the incidence rates of teleworking, see, 
for example, Eurofound (2010) report on teleworking in the EU. 
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effectively incorporate this temporal aspect of part-day teleworking, we apply Vickrey’s (1969) dynamic 
bottleneck model, a work-horse model in transportation economics, in which the drivers’ scheduling 
decisions are endogenous. 
We model the behavioral impacts of teleworking by assuming that access to the teleworking-enabling 
ICT raises utility that an individual derives from being at home at any given point in time. We therefore 
define a teleworking individual as a person who is equipped with a technology that allows her to 
perform various work tasks from home. An equipped individual values time spent at home higher than 
an unequipped one, and, as we show later, has an incentive to postpone the arrival time at work. The 
choice of whether to be equipped is determined within the model; thus our model may produce 
endogenous heterogeneity of drivers, if not everybody chooses to become equipped. We derive an 
inverse demand for the teleworking technology, and show that the marginal willingness to pay depends 
negatively on the number of teleworking people, due to the relatively large congestion externality 
equipped drivers impose on one another. We show that even costless technology might be marginally 
welfare reducing after teleworking reaches a certain optimal penetration level. We also study private 
market provision of the teleworking technology, both under perfect competition and monopoly, and 
define conditions when the social welfare is found to be higher under monopoly. 
Our study fits into a wider literature that considers the potential impacts of ICT on congestion and social 
welfare. However, most of this literature focuses on the provision of traffic information to drivers; see 
for example, Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1996); de Palma and Lindsey (1998); and Emmerink, 
Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1998a, 1998b). These studies consistently show that under an unpriced 
congestion externality, the marginal effect of information might sometimes be welfare decreasing. To 
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to show this in the context of teleworking. Given the 
popularity of ICT-based solutions to traffic congestion, these results are important for practical policy 
making. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces Vickrey’s dynamic bottleneck model, and 
teleworking within that framework. Section 3 derives the marginal willingness to pay for and social 
benefits of teleworking. Section 4 considers private provision of the teleworking technology in markets 
of perfect competition and monopoly. We evaluate the relative efficiency of market outcomes, 
compared to the social optimum. Section 5 considers the impact of teleworking on travel in case first-
best road tolling already addresses congestion externality. Section 6 summarizes the paper, highlights 
the main findings, and concludes with a list of possible extensions. 
 
2. Teleworking within Vickrey’s dynamic bottleneck model 
 
2.1. Basic model 
Our analysis is cast in the framework of Vickrey’s (1969) dynamic bottleneck model. The standard 
bottleneck model uses a conventional linearized scheduling model, attributed to Vickrey (1969) and 
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Small (1982), and now extensively used in the transportation economics literature. The model considers 
a traffic jam at a single bottleneck with a capacity  on a road connecting one origin (“home”) and one 
destination (“work”).  homogeneous atomistic drivers, with a common preferred arrival time at work , commute (in the morning) from home to work. Time spent on travel (or travel delay) is entirely due 
to waiting in a “first-in first-out” traffic jam, which starts building up after the flow of drivers arriving to 
the bottleneck has first exceeded its capacity. The (free-flow) travel time is set to zero, without loss of 
generality in this context, implying that without a queue drivers depart from home, pass the bottleneck 
and arrive at work at the same moment. This stylized description of traffic congestion offers a 
framework for studying dynamic departure time decisions, and the dynamic evolving of traffic 
conditions over the peak within one analytical model that lends itself to closed-form solutions of optima 
and equilibria (e.g., Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 1993). 
Vickrey (1973), and later Tseng and Verhoef (2008), proposed a somewhat more general specification of 
scheduling behavior and utility, which explicitly describes the underlying pattern of activities in terms of 
time-dependent utilities and opportunity costs. In this approach, a driver is confronted with time-variant 
utilities of being in various locations. This specification is useful for our purposes, as it allows us to 
incorporate the impact of teleworking technology in the bottleneck model in a structured way. In this 
approach, a driver derives utility from being either at home ( per unit of time), at work ( per 
unit of time), or in a vehicle (, normalized at zero for convenience).3 Tseng and Verhoef (2008) show 
that if (and only if) these functions are such that  is equal to some constant ( henceforth) 
throughout the period considered, while  is piecewise constant with a certain upward jump at , 
and   
   before  and      after , it is equivalent to the standard linear             
  
Figure 1. Utility structure and opportunity costs for a driver in the conventional representation of 
Vickrey’s bottleneck model 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on Tseng and Verhoef (2008), Fig. 2. 
                                                          
3 Strictly speaking, ,  and  are Marshallian surpluses, which are the ratio
respectively, home, work and in a vehicle, over marginal utility of income. For bTime of the day,   
 
  	 
    Utility per unit of 
time,   s of marginal utility of time spend at 
revity we refer to them as utilities. 
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scheduling model in which there is a time-invariant value of travel time (), a constant unit shadow price 
of schedule delay early (	), and one of schedule delay late (). The equivalence stems from the fact that 
the opportunity cost of being at work before  is, then,   
  	; the opportunity cost of not being 
at work after  is     ; and the opportunity cost of being in a vehicle is     . We plot this 
utility structure in Figure 1.  
While various utility specifications for  and  are possible, we use the above linearized one 
primarily to stay as close as possible to the conventional linear scheduling model which assumes 
constancy of , 	 and  (Small, 1982) and which has been applied in the bulk of the bottleneck model 
literature. It is therefore a natural choice, and we expect that insights on the desirability of different 
market structures for the supply of teleworking technology will not depend critically on this specific 
choice. 
The single margin of behavior in this model is the arrival time at work, , which a driver sets to maximize 
utility over the course of the morning that starts for every driver at the common time  and finishes at  (chosen such that the interval is wide enough to cover the entire peak). An individual’s utility level is 
equal to an “ideal” utility level , which a driver would reach over the course of the morning, had she 
both departed and arrived at the preferred arrival time , minus the generalized travel cost she actually 
incurs. The latter consists of travel time and schedule delay costs, and will be denoted , where  
denotes the arrival time at work. A driver incurs schedule delay cost when the time of her arrival at work 
is not . Each minute of arriving at work either early or late has a value of, respectively, 	 and . In turn, 
each minute of travel delay, , has a value of time . 
Thus, the utility level of a driver arriving to work at time  is: 
 
(1)                   	       !            
 
Note that the first two terms are constants, and the final two (time-depended) terms correspond to the 
conventional generalized cost of travel. 
In a dynamic equilibrium, the utility levels of all (homogeneous) drivers must be equal; i.e., no one is 
able to adjust her arrival time and consequently gain in utility. The very first driver arrives at work at 
time " and faces no travel time costs as she freely passes the bottleneck. But she incurs schedule delay 
costs from being early at work; thus, her generalized cost is 	#  "$. Likewise the very last driver who 
arrives at time "% incurs the cost of arriving late at work; the generalized travel cost is then # "%  $. 
Because the ideal utility level  is identical across drivers, the equilibrium condition implies equality of 
generalized travel costs. Given that the duration of the peak period is 
&'  "   "%, traffic starts and 
ends at: 
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"  
(2)  "    )*+) &'  
(3)  "′    **+) &'  
 
The generalized travel costs are then: 
 
(4)   *)*+) &'  
 
(see also Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 1993). 
The driver who arrives at work at time , only incurs travel time cost . In equilibrium, she has the 
same generalized travel cost as the first driver; hence,   *)*+) &' ,-. 
The dynamic bottleneck model highlights an important equilibrating mechanism affecting behavior in 
traffic congestion: the trade-off that drivers make between schedule costs of arriving at an inconvenient 
time, versus the travel delay cost of waiting in the queue. In equilibrium, when generalized costs are 
identical across drivers, for those who arrive before  each additional one minute arrived closer to   
decreases the schedule delay cost by 	, but must increase travel time by *- to keep generalized cost 
constant over time. In the same fashion, for arrivals later than  the travel delay decreases with )- by 
arrival time to keep generalized cost constant. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium combinations of arrival 
times and travel delays. The slopes of the triangle naturally depends on the parameters , 	, ; while 
the width depends on 
&' , which determines the duration of the peak (the time interval between  " and  "%). As the generalized costs are constant over time, one may interpret the graph as an isocost 
function. As there are no arrival times with a generalized cost level below the equilibrium level, the 
equilibrium in Vickrey’s dynamic bottleneck model is a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Figure 2. Isocost function of the homogeneous drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 "( Time of the day,  
 	 Travel delay,   
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2.2 Introduction of teleworking technology 
The framework shown in Figure 1 helps us to make a structured and well-motivated assumption on how 
the availability of teleworking technology would affect the value of time components , 	 and . 
Sticking to a piecewise constant utility structure, and assuming that the technology would affect the 
utility of being at home (not of being  at work or in the vehicle), the natural assumption to make is that it 
shifts  upwards; and does so by some constant to maintain the qualitative pattern displayed in Figure 
1. This means that, in terms of the conventional scheduling formulation, adaptation of teleworking 
technology will lead to equally large increases in  and 	, and a decrease in  that is equally large in 
absolute size. Intuitively, an individual equipped with the teleworking technology would put a higher 
value on time spent at home before , as being at home results in higher utility due to the possibility of 
teleworking. At the same time, for an equipped driver, who arrives at work after , a trip does not 
cause as much cost as for an unequipped one, as a teleworker partly “compensates” the disutility of a 
delayed arrival at work with working from home. 
A constant shift in  due to teleworking technology implies that an equipped driver starts gaining higher 
utility from being at home right after the beginning of the morning, at . That might represent that an 
equipped driver works during the entire morning, or, alternatively, that due to the availability of 
technology an individual is able to reschedule other activities (not modeled explicitly) in such a way that 
the utility derived from being at home before the start of teleworking rises.  
Of course, other assumptions could be made on how teleworking would affect the individual’s utility 
function. We believe our assumption captures the most relevant aspect of the issue, in the simplest 
possible utility specification. Specifically, only with a constant upward shift of  would the individual, 
both before and after being equipped, have a utility function that can be characterized by three 
constant shadow prices , 	 and . 
We thus assume the technology raises the unit value of staying at home by a constant .   . The latter 
constraint assures that also those drivers who are equipped with the teleworking technology still find it 
worthwhile to be at work at time  /  . Note from Figure 1 that our specification leaves the preferred 
arrival time  unchanged. This is in fact a welcome feature, because it secures that any shift of the peak 
period that results from adaptation of technology by drivers (which we do find) can be ascribed solely to 
the impact of changes in , , 	 and ; and not to a change of .  
 
3. Marginal willingness to pay for and externalities of teleworking technology 
 
3.1 Marginal willingness to pay for teleworking technology 
In this section we derive the marginal willingness to pay for acquiring teleworking technology. We will 
show that this willingness to pay depends on the aggregate level of technology penetration: if fewer 
drivers are equipped with the technology, an individual driver is willing to pay more for it. 
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The marginal willingness to pay for teleworking technology can be determined as the difference 
between the utility that a driver reaches over the course of the morning if one is equipped with the 
technology, minus the utility when being unequipped. As follows from Equation (1), changes in 
opportunity costs , 	 and , affect an individual’s utility via a change in the ideal utility, , and in the 
generalized travel costs that one incurs, . A driver equipped with teleworking technology has a higher 
ideal utility than an unequipped driver, because between  and  a higher utility of being at home is 
enjoyed.4 This increase in ideal utility is, of course, identical for all teleworkers, and does not depend on 
one’s arrival time at work.  
Both equipped and unequipped drivers choose their arrival time at work  to minimize generalized travel 
costs. With different time values , 	 and , the slopes of isocost functions as shown in Figure 2 may 
differ between drivers as well. Therefore, a driver who adopts the technology may have an incentive to 
change the arrival time at work, in order to minimize generalized travel costs under the new time values. 
Dynamic equilibrium requires that for both groups of travelers (if both are greater than zero in size) the 
generalized travel costs are equal at moments when arrivals occur, and not lower at other times. We will 
see shortly that this will involve temporal separation of travelers if both types exist. 
To see why this occurs, first note that the upper envelope of the isocost functions, for both groups, 
corresponds to the equilibrium pattern of travel delays. Let 0  be the number of equipped drivers, 1 
and 1
 are the numbers of unequipped drivers arriving at work, respectively, after (“late”) and before 
(“early”) . For a fixed overall number of drivers, , the duration of the peak period will be &'  &2' &34'  &35' . The timing of the beginning of the peak, however, is endogenous.  
To determine equilibrium level of generalized cost, we have to distinguish between cases with relatively 
low numbers of equipped drivers (6 ! 0 ! 07), and high numbers (07  0 ! ), where 07 is 
defined later. With low numbers, equipped drivers will arrive only after . Figure 3 illustrates this type 
of equilibrium, and shows the equilibrium isocost functions for both types of drivers. The isocost lines of 
unequipped drivers have slopes 
*- and )- 8 those of equipped drivers have slopes *+.-+. and )9.-+.. The slope 
for equipped drivers is, therefore, steeper for early arrivals and flatter for late ones. It is very easy to 
prove that the first single (atomistic) driver who gets equipped prefers to be the last traveler passing the 
bottleneck. Given the equilibrium isocost line for unequipped drivers, which gives the equilibrium 
pattern of travel times for this group, the last arrival time brings the single equipped driver at the lowest 
achievable isocost line. This driver spends the peak at home, benefits from teleworking, and then travels 
to work incurring generalized travel costs of 
*)9.*+) &' . As more drivers become equipped, their 
equilibrium isocost function will shift upwards to accommodate the increasing number 0. At the same 
time, the equilibrium isocost of the unequipped group moves downward as there is decreasing demand 
for early arrivals. The different slopes of isocost lines in Figure 3 thus induce a temporal separation of 
travelers where equipped drivers arrive later than unequipped ones. 
                                                          
4 The difference in ideal utility levels of equipped drivers 0  and unequipped ones 1 is 0  1  .   / 6, 
which is greater than zero whenever    and .  6, as we assume. 
 Figure 3. Isocost functions of the heterogeneous drivers, if equipped drivers arrive at work late 
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(5) :  ;  *- &35'  *- &9&29&34'   
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. &2'   
(7) ;   <='   
 
These equalities can easily be verified in Figure 3. &34'  (i.e., the duration of the interval where unequi
of the peak before ) as a function of 0: 
 
(8) &34'  **+) &'  -+.*+-)9.-+.*+) &2'  
(9) 
&35'  )*+) &'  .-+)-+.*+) &2'  
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(10) 07  *-+>*-+>+-)9>  
 
Multiplying (9) by 	, we get the generalized travel costs of unequipped drivers as a function of 0  (for 6 ! 0 ! 07): 
 
(11) 1  &35' 	  )**+) &'  .*-+)-+.*+) &2'  
 
This shows that the generalized travel costs of unequipped drivers is decreasing when the share of 
equipped drivers rises. Thus, equipped drivers in some sense impose a positive external effect on 
unequipped drivers. More precisely, they impose a smaller external cost on unequipped drivers than 
unequipped drivers do themselves. The underlying reason is that the groups have different preferences 
for arrival time adjustments, where equipped drivers have a less strong demand for early arrivals. The 
utility of unequipped drivers is the ideal utility minus the generalized travel costs: 
 
(12) 1  1  1            )**+) &'  .*-+)-+.*+) &2'  
 
Next, the generalized travel costs of equipped drivers amount to 
 
(13)  0  ?&34'  &2' @   .  *)9.*+) &'  .)9.-+)-+.*+) &2'  
 
The higher the number of equipped drivers, the larger their travel costs. Equipped drivers impose a 
negative marginal externality on their own group, that exceeds the negative externality from 
unequipped drivers. Both terms in (13) are positive, where the second one represents the additional 
impact of an equipped driver on 0 above the one of unequipped drivers. The utility of equipped drivers 
is therefore:  
 
(14) 0  0  0    .          *)9.*+) &'  .)9.-+)-+.*+) &2'  
 
By subtracting (12) from (14) we find the marginal willingness to pay (A) for teleworking 
technology as a function of the number of adopters 0, when their number is “low”, 6 ! B !  07: 
 
(15) A  0  1  0  0  1  1  .    *C*+) &'  C*+)9C-+)-+C*+) &2'  
 A is downward sloping with respect to 0, so if more drivers are equipped, an additional 
individual driver is willing to pay less for it. That is true for both the marginal unequipped driver who 
becomes equipped, but also for the already equipped drivers, who have the same benefit of being 
equipped as the marginal equipped driver. Hence, the total benefit for the equipped drivers collectively 
is A0.  
 
Figure 4. Isocost functions of the heterogeneous drivers, if equipped drivers arrive at work late and early 
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After substituting (17) and (18) into (16), we derive 
&25'  (i.e., the duration of the interval when equipped 
drivers arrive early) and  
&24'  (i.e., the duration of the peak after ): 
 
(19)  
&25'   -+.*-*+) &'  -+.*+-)9.-*+) &2'  
(20) 
&24'  -+.*-*+) &'  -9*.-*+) &2'  
 
The generalized cost for equipped drivers, and the implied utility, become: 
 
(21) 0  &24'   .  )9.-+.*-*+) &'  -9*.)9.-*+) &2'  
 
and 
 
(22) 0  0  0    .          )9.-+.*-*+) &'  -9*.)9.-*+) &2'  
 
For an unequipped driver we find: 
 
(23) 1  ?&'  &24' @ 	  ?&'  -+.*-*+) &'  -9*.-*+) &2' @ 	 
 
and 
 
(24) 1  1  1             ?&'  -+.**+) &'  -9*.*+) &2' @ 	 
 
By subtracting (24) from (22) we find the A when 0  is “high” or 07  0 !  : 
 
(25) AD  0  1  0  0  1  1  .    *>*9-+)9>-*+) &'  >*+)9>-9*-*+) &2'  
 
The slope of A in the range 07  B !  , implied by (25), is flatter than in the range 6 ! 0 !07 (see equation (15)), resulting in a kink in A function at 07. Equations (15) and (25) imply the 
same A value at 07. Figure 5 illustrates the marginal willingness to pay function as given by 
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equations (15) and (25). Although the A is declining, also the very last driver to become equipped 
has a positive willingness to pay, because we set the start of the day  before the first driver arrives at 
work when teleworking possibility is not available (i.e.,    / )*+) &' ). Under this constraint, the A value at , as shown in Figure 5, is positive, since then A  .E*+) &' . A positive A also 
for the last driver to become equipped is consistent with the notion that even when not changing 
departure time, this driver has benefited at a rate F over the time spent home between the start of the 
day and the moment of departing. 
 
Figure 5. Marginal willingness to pay for teleworking technology 
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minus the marginal external cost for all equipped drivers, plus the marginal external benefits5 of all 
unequipped drivers. The marginal external benefits of all unequipped drivers is the derivative of their 
generalized travel costs with respect to number of equipped drivers, multiplied by the number of 
unequipped drivers; and similarly for equipped drivers.  
One can also determine the AGH by taking the derivative of the total generalized travel costs of all 
drivers jointly with respect to the number of equipped drivers. AGH is then minus the resulting 
derivative plus the increase in ideal utility for a single driver who is getting equipped. It has been verified 
that the two approaches lead to the same result. 
Let us first consider the case where the number of teleworkers is “low”, i.e., 6 ! 0 !  07. The 
marginal benefits of all unequipped drivers is then: 
 
(26) AGH1   JK3J&2   0  .*-+)&9&2-+.*+)'  
 
Likewise, the overall marginal costs of already equipped drivers is: 
 
(27) AGH0   JK2J&2 0   .)9.-+)-+.*+) &2'  
 
The marginal social benefit function, conditional on “low” number of equipped drivers, 6 ! 0 !  07, is 
then the sum of (15), (26) and (27), which gives: 
 
(28)  AGH  .    *>L-+>+)-+>*+) &'  M >*+)9>-+)-+>*+) &2'  
 
In the same fashion, but now using cost functions for “high” levels of penetration, we can define AGH in 
the range 07  B !  . This results in: 
 
(29) AGHD  .    *>L*9L-+)9.-*+) &'  M >*+)9>-9*-*+) &2'  
 
Note that AGH and AGHD have different slopes and intercepts, and overall AGH is discontinuous at 07. This discontinuity stems from the differences in external effects that drivers impose upon one 
another in early arrivals compared to later ones. 
                                                          
5 For brevity we refer to the decrease in marginal external cost for unequipped drivers as if it were a marginal 
external benefit. 
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Comparing AGH as given in equations (28) and (29) to A, in equations (15) and (25), we can 
establish that the slope of the AGH function is twice as steep as the slope of the A.  
In particular, let GN be the total social costs, O  JK3J&2, and P and Q are constants to be defined below. 
Following equations (11), (13), (21), (23) we can write the difference in generalized travel costs as a 
function of the number of equipped drivers 0: 1  0  P  Q0, with  
P  R *.*+)' S                          6 ! 0 !  07 *.-9*9)+.-*+)' S              07  B !     
Q  R.-+)*9.+)-+.*+)' S               6 ! 0 !  07  .-9**9.+)-*+)' S              07  B !    . 
For both “low” and “high” ranges of the technology penetration we can write A as: 
A  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  .    P  Q0. 
GN is the sum of the costs of equipped and unequipped drivers: 
GN  11  00    01  00  1  00  1  1  0Q0  P 
Note that by definition AGH   JTUJ&2  0  1; that leads to: 
AGH  VGNV0  0  1   V1V0  MQ0  P  .    O  MQ0  P  .   
From equations (11) and (23) we see that O is a (negative) constant which does not depend on 0, 
hence: 
AGH  .    P  O  MQ0   
 
4. Supply of teleworking technology  
 
4.1 Perfect competition 
In this section we examine the pricing strategies of private (profit maximizing) and public (welfare 
maximizing) firms that could supply the teleworking technology to drivers. In particular, we are 
interested in the relative efficiency of private market outcomes, compared to the social optimum. The 
profit maximizing price is, for a given market structure, determined by the marginal willingness to pay 
and marginal revenue on the one hand, and marginal costs on the other. At the same time, to reach the 
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social optimum, a public provider should set a price that assures the equality of marginal social costs 
and marginal social benefits.  
We assume that the marginal (social) cost of technology provision is zero. Besides simplifying the 
analysis, this assumption strengthens our finding that unrestricted supply of the teleworking technology 
might be marginally socially detrimental. The essential outcomes are not likely to change with the 
introduction of positive marginal costs. First, we will consider a market with perfect competition, where 
congestion is the single market friction. Then we introduce another market friction in combination to 
congestion: the existence of market power by a monopolist.  
Under perfect competition the price will be equal to zero marginal costs, so that all drivers will be 
equipped with teleworking technology: 0KU  . The reason is that the A, following the 
discussion in the previous section, is always positive (see Figure 5). The total social benefits under 
perfect competition (GHKU) is then the integral of marginal social benefits, given by equations (28) and 
(29): 
 
(30) GHKU  W AGH V0&27X  W AGHD V0&&27  
 
In contrast, a public firm sets the price and corresponding level of technology penetration, 0Y, such 
that the total social benefits are maximized: 
 
(31) GHY    Z[\&]&2^ _ ?W AGH V0&27X  W AGHD V0&2^ _&27 @ 
 
Indeed, as used in (31), it is easy to prove that, under zero marginal cost, the first-best level of 
technology penetration, 0Y, is always in the range  / 0Y  07, implying that some equipped 
drivers arrive before .6 If the corner solution 0Y   holds, a competitive market provides the 
optimal outcome. Otherwise, GHKU  GHY, meaning that taxation is required to achieve higher 
social welfare, by bringing down the number of equipped drivers from  to 0Y.7  
We first compare the outcomes of perfect competition and first-best. Some results are cumbersome to 
present algebraically, so in this section we present results graphically. In this model numerical analysis 
                                                          
6 AGHis a discontinuous function which might cross marginal cost line of zero in two points: in the low and high 
ranges of penetration 0. We compared the two integrals of AGH, one where the upper limit corresponds to the 
point of intersection in the low range, and one in the high range. The latter integral is always larger than the 
former. This also holds when AGH crosses the horizontal line only in the low range, while in the high range it ends 
up in the corner solution. 
7 When marginal costs are positive and large enough, it might be possible that perfect competition will supply less 
than the optimal number of drivers, and then a subsidy is appropriate. From equations of A (15) and AGH 
(28) it follows that if marginal costs are larger than .    *.)9.&-+.*+)', then the competitive technology 
penetration level falls short of social optimal one, 0KU  0Y. 
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can in fact be rather exhaustive, because all functions that are necessary for the analysis are dependent 
only on four parameters , 	,  and .. Without loss of generality, we normalize opportunity cost of 
being late at workplace as   `. The model restricts the effect from teleworking to .a 6S . Most of 
the empirical literature suggests the relationship     	 (e.g., Small, 1982). The relevant parameter 
space might then be shown as a cube with the edges , 	 and ., each of a length 1 (if desired, one could 
easily relax the constraint to allow both  and 	 to be larger than ). Without loss of generality, we 
normalize the overall number of drivers  to 100, and set road capacity  to 1, so that the duration of 
the peak is 100. This does not affect the results of interest. In subsequent computations we define the 
beginning of the day  as the arrival time of the first driver when no teleworking is available (see 
equation (2)). We can safely do this, because an introduction of teleworking shifts the arrival window to 
later times. The reallocation of  to an earlier stage increases the ideal utility 0, as the time during 
which drivers are able to gain benefits from teleworking expands. But the increase takes place over a 
period where no one travels under any equilibrium, and we like to keep this “benefit” as small as 
possible. Changes in the end time  do not affect the comparative performance of equilibria with and 
without teleworking, as this involves times of the day where only  matters for overall welfare, and 
this is not affected by the adaptation of the technology. 
Figure 6 shows the domain of parameters values which make the perfect competition outcome of full 
penetration of the teleworking technology socially less desirable than the first-best outcome. The 
combinations of , 	 and . within the meshed body are those for which GHKU  GHY. The domain 
outside the meshed body in Figure 6, in so far as it complies with the restriction   	, corresponds to 
the values where the competitive market generates the first-best outcome.  
 
Figure 6. Parameter combinations that correspond to an above-optimal level of teleworking penetration 
under perfect competition,   ` 
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To determine the conditions under which perfect competition could lead to an above-optimal 
penetration level, first observe that when the last unequipped driver gets equipped, she gains 
CE*+) &'  in 
terms of private benefits (from equation (25)) and, at the same time, imposes a negative externality .-9*)9.-*+) &'  on all other drivers (derived as JK2J&2 , where 0 is from equation (21)). From the inequality CE*+) &' / .-9*)9.-*+) &'  we can then derive the condition for perfect competition to yield the first-best 
welfare gain (again, when the marginal costs are zero): 
 
(32) ./ -9*L-9* 
 
given that   `. When 	 b 6, this condition becomes . 6cd. If 	 b , then it becomes . 6. The 
intuition behind this pattern is as follows. 
The reason why perfect competition might not lead to the first-best outcome, is that there is a 
difference between external costs that unequipped drivers impose on others, and the external costs 
from equipped drivers. That difference is small when 	 b ; and at the limit, when 	  , it disappears 
completely. This happens because the slopes of isocost lines of early arrivals of both equipped and 
unequipped drivers become identical: 
ef  e+.f+.  `. This mean that both groups trade off travel time 
and schedule delay costs identically, that the groups are not separated in time, and thus impose the 
same external effects on each other (see Figure 4). An individual decision to become equipped then 
does not imply a change in the individual’s external cost, so that as long as the individual herself benefits 
from doing so, also the net social welfare gain is positive. Even a small positive . is then enough to make 
full penetration of teleworking socially beneficial. However, when the difference in slopes of isocost 
lines between equipped and unequipped becomes larger ( and 	 diverge), implying larger differences 
in imposed negative externalities, a bigger gain . is required to “compensate” for larger net external 
costs imposed, and to make full penetration also socially optimal. This explains the shape of the body in 
Figure 6. 
 
4.2 Private monopoly 
A private monopolistic provider is assumed to set the profit maximizing price. The profit of the 
monopolist (gh), given zero marginal costs, and ignoring fixed costs is the maximized integral of the 
marginal revenue (Ai) function, which itself directly follows from the A functions (15) and (25). 
For both ranges of levels of technology penetration, high and low, Ai is twice as steep as the A. 
The monopolist’s profit is: 
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(33) gh  R W Ai V0&2
jX                                           k 6 ! 0h ! 07W Ai V0  W AiD V0            &2j&27&27X k 07  0h ! 
 
 
where the number of equipped drivers under monopoly is 0h  [lmZ[\&2  gh. The corresponding total 
social benefits (GHh) is then the integral of marginal social benefits (equations (28) and (29)), with 0h 
as the upper limit: 
(34) GHh   RW AGH V0&2
jX                                             k 6 !  0h !  07W AGH V0  W AGHD V0           &2j&27&27X k 07  0h ! 
 
 
Because Ai and AGH are generally not equal, the monopolist matches the first-best outcome only 
when achieving full penetration; i.e., when 0h  . This requires Ai to be high enough, for instance, 
when . is large. 
AGH always exceeds Ai (as follows from discussion in Section 3); thus, the private monopolist will 
never supply more than optimal number of drivers with teleworking technology. One underlying reason 
is that the private provider internalizes the negative external effects that its customers impose upon one 
another. The positive externalities of teleworking to unequipped drivers are, however, left outside the 
pricing rule, implying that the profit-maximizing price exceeds the welfare-maximizing price for reasons 
other than the classical demand-related mark-up. We can summarize our findings on the level of 
penetration under different market forms as follows: 0h ! 0Y ! 0KU. 
 
Figure 7. Parameter combinations that correspond to the larger total social welfare under monopoly 
than under perfect competition,   ` 
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Next, in Figure 7 we compare the welfare outcomes of perfect competition versus the private monopoly. 
The combination of , 	 and . within the meshed body are those for which GHKU  GHh, so 
monopoly produces a higher social welfare than perfect competition does. The parameter space outside 
the meshed body, insofar as   	, corresponds to the values where either perfect competition 
outperforms monopoly, or where both yield the same outcome in terms of social welfare. 
For a sizable parameter space, a monopoly market leads to a higher social welfare than perfect 
competition. The body of Figure 7 lies entirely within that of Figure 6. That is: total social benefits under 
monopoly can be larger than under perfect competition only if perfect competition itself is not the first-
best outcome. If the strict inequality 0h  0Y  0KU  holds, the monopoly level of penetration might 
be “closer” (in terms of welfare) to the first-best level than perfect competition, as the latter always 
produces . Figure 7 shows that perfect competition is particularly “harmful” in terms of oversupply 
when the differences between external effects of unequipped on equipped vs. equipped on themselves 
is large; i.e., when 	 diverges from . Not shown explicitly in Figure 7 is the subset of parameter values 
where the monopolist prefers to be in the low range of penetration; i.e. 6 !  0h !  07. That area 
touches the one shown in Figure 7, and is located in the bottom part (low .), in the corner with high  
and 	 (but   	). There, the resulting GHh is so low, that oversupply of perfect competition is 
socially preferable.  
 
5. Teleworking with the first-best road toll 
 
We have now established how, in the presence of congestion, the use of teleworking technology by 
equipped drivers causes externalities for others. A consequence is that it may not be optimal to supply 
the technology at marginal cost; zero, in our case. The second-best distortion that is responsible for this, 
is the unpriced congestion at the bottleneck. An interesting question is whether the externality in 
consumption of the technology, and hence the optimal deviation from marginal cost pricing, vanishes 
when congestion at the bottleneck is optimally priced.  
A central result in the literature on Vickrey’s dynamic bottleneck model is that waiting time, and thus 
travel time cost, is a pure social loss which can be fully eliminated (Vickrey, 1969; Arnott, de Palma and 
Lindsey, 1993). Time-dependent road pricing can achieve this. The social optimum is achieved by levying 
a first-best time-dependent road toll that exactly equals the travel time costs in the no-toll equilibrium, 
at each moment of arrival. Thus, instead of waiting in the queue, drivers pay a toll and incur no waiting 
time. With homogeneous drivers, the generalized travel price thus remains unchanged, compared to the 
no-toll case considered earlier. But from the social viewpoint, a toll is not a cost component, but a 
welfare neutral monetary transfer from road users to government. The welfare gain from first-best 
pricing is therefore equal to the total toll revenues, and therewith to the total savings in travel time cost. 
For more in-depth discussion of the model with pricing we refer to, among others, Arnott, de Palma and 
Lindsey (1993). 
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required to bring AGH equal to the marginal costs under perfect competition. And under monopoly, the 
regular overpricing due to market power occurs. 
Finally, note that for both low (6 ! 0 ! 07), and high numbers (07  0 ! ) of equipped drivers, 
the functions are the same, i.e., there is now no kink in A, and no discontinuity in the AGH. The 
reason why the kink in A disappears is that equipped drivers impose an identical unpriced net 
externality, namely zero under first-best pricing, whether they arrive after or before . It was the 
difference in unpriced externalities imposed by early versus late equipped drivers that caused the kink 
for the no-toll case, and this difference now no longer exists with optimal pricing. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
We investigated the welfare effects from teleworking becoming available for a congested bottleneck, 
using Vickrey’s (1969) dynamic bottleneck model. Teleworking was modeled as an increase in the utility 
that a person derives from being at home, sufficiently small to keep commuting worthwhile. We derive 
the marginal willingness to pay for teleworking as the difference in utility that a driver gains when being 
equipped, compared to being unequipped. Getting the possibility of teleworking creates differences in 
the utility parameters of otherwise homogeneous drivers, and therefore affects their dynamic travel 
behavior. As the marginal external costs differ between equipped and unequipped drivers, the decision 
to become equipped influences travel costs of all other drivers. We derive generalized travel costs for 
both equipped and unequipped drivers, and the total social benefits of teleworking as a function of the 
number of equipped drivers. The optimal level of technology penetration is then such that the marginal 
social benefit is equal to the marginal social cost. We compare the relative efficiency of private market 
outcomes, under monopoly and perfect competition, to the social optimum. Finally, we examine the 
effect of teleworking on travel costs when the congestion externality is internalized using the time-
dependent first-best road toll. 
We find that even costless teleworking might have an adverse marginal effect on social welfare, when a 
certain level of technology penetration is reached, due to the negative externality it creates. The very 
first unequipped driver who becomes equipped prefers to be the only one teleworking, as equipped 
drivers impose higher external travel cost on one another than unequipped impose on them. The more 
people are teleworking, therefore, the lower the benefits of teleworking for each individual equipped 
driver. The remaining unequipped drivers enjoy positive effects of teleworking: the negative externality 
of equipped drivers on unequipped ones is lower than what unequipped drivers impose up on one 
another. Although full penetration of costless teleworking is always socially more beneficial than no 
teleworking at all, there exists an optimal degree of driver heterogeneity. An increase in the number of 
equipped drivers above that level lowers social welfare. 
Our results show that a private monopolistic supplier of a teleworking technology might yield a higher 
social welfare than perfect competition does. Under perfect competition, with zero marginal cost, all 
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drivers are teleworking, as the endogenous marginal willingness to pay for teleworking is always 
positive. A full penetration might, however, be socially excessive. At the same time, a monopolist 
charges a mark-up, while taking into account the negative effects its customers impose one each other, 
ignoring the positive effects on unequipped drivers. The level of penetration under monopoly could 
consequently be below the optimal level. We identified the conditions under which the monopoly 
outcome is “closer” to optimal, from a social welfare viewpoint, than that of perfect competition. 
A policy that would eliminate the congestion externality would also get rid of the changes in 
externalities resulting from purchase of the technology. Time-dependent first-best road toll achieves 
this, and makes teleworking technology a conventional good, which does not require any policy 
interventions.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to model the effect of (part-day) teleworking on 
generalized travel costs. We have used a conventional linearized scheduling model, as considered by 
Vickrey (1969), Small (1982), Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey (1993), but we assumed it stems from 
preferences of being at home and being at work in a way as described by Vickrey (1973) and, later, by 
Tseng and Verhoef (2008). We found this framework suits well for the analysis and yields interesting 
insights. 
There is ample scope for further research on the effects of teleworking on travel within the considered 
framework. Among the possible extensions are a consideration of initial driver heterogeneity; variation 
in teleworking technology; and more complex road networks allowing for an explicit consideration of 
spatial and network effects, in addition to the temporal dimension considered here. It might also be 
interesting to incorporate other effects of teleworking besides those on travel costs, such as effects on 
productivity, work-life balance, etc., to get the full picture of the overall effect of teleworking on 
welfare. 
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